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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCK-OLA MANUFACTURING 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAN STEWART COMPANY, INC., 
and DAN STEWART, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9266 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PlaintiJf-respondent has been for many years a manufac-
turer of commercial phonographs. Defendants-appellants are 
retail dealers in commercial phonographs. Since July 27, 1950, 
appellants have been buying and reselling respondent's goods 
as one of respondent's distributors, the parties having executed 
new distributor contracts from time to time (Exh. 2). 
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Between February 20, 1959, and April 1, 1959, appellants 
ordered eleven phonograph machines from respondent and 
used the machines but did not pay for them. Pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement between respondent and appellants 
(R. 42, Exh. 1), on July 1, 1959 respondent cancelled the 
agreement and on August 20, 1959, filed this action for the 
price of the machines. Subsequently respondent and appellants 
entered into a stipulation (R. 9) by which respondent was to 
have judgment on its complaint; in addition, appellants' un-
timely counterclaim for $50,000.00 (R. 7) interest and costs, 
was permitted to remain. 
At the pre-trial conference, appellants conceded that there 
was no basis for paragraph 1 of their counterclaim in the 
amount of $851.50 and this claim was stricken (R. 24). The 
Court allowed appellants to file an Amended Counterclaim 
(R. 25), the gravamen of which was that on January 2, 1959, 
respondent and appellants had entered into an agreement 
whereby appellants had the Hexclusive" right to sell respond-
ent's products in a given territory; that respondent had breached 
this agreement by Hconspiring" with another of its distributors, 
one UniCon Distributing Company of Kansas City, Kansas, 
to sell respondent's products in appellants' territory to a 
c~mpany named B & G Sales. Appellants also alleged that 
respondent had Hfraudulently, deceitfully, and with intent 
to avoid said agreement and the terms thereof, and without 
any notice whatsoever to defendants [appellants] appointed 
said Baker and Gardner [ B & G Sales] distributors for said 
machines in said territory." 
At the pre-trial conference, respondent moved for summary 
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judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that respondent was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. The motion was based on the record and 
the depositions of appellant Dan Stewart and of two witnesses 
called by appellants, R. ]. Baker and Melvin C. Gardner 
(R. 24). Argument was heard and briefs were submitted 
(R. 28). The Court granted respondent's motion and dismissed 
appellants' counterclaim (R. 3 5). 
This appeal is directed only to the trial court's order 
dismissing defendants-appellants' counterclaim. To prevail, 
appellants must show that the trial court erred in finding fron1 
the undisputed evidence that: 
1. The contract between respondent and appellants was 
non-exclusive; and 
2. The contract between respondent and appellants was 
not breached by respondent. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The agreement under which respondent and appellants 
\vere operating did not give appellants the exclusive right to 
sell respondent's products in a given territory. 
2. Even if the agreement had given appellants such an 
exclusive right, there was no breach of this agreement by 
respondent. 
3. A summary judgment was properly awarded. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH RESPONDENT 
AND APPELLANTS WERE OPERATING DID NOT GIVE 
APPELLANTS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL RE-
SPONDENT'S PRODUCTS IN A GIVEN TERRITORY. 
Appellants claim (R. 25) that respondent granted them 
by contract an exclusive right to sell respondent's products in 
a given territory. In evidence of this claim appellants introduced 
the agreement (R. 42, Exh. 1) which is the subject of appel-
lants' counterclaim. 
Pages 9 and 10 of appellants' brief are largely devoted 
to the proposition that there is a lack of mutuality of obligation 
in the instant contract, and authorities are cited for the propo-
sition that when such lack of mutuality exists in an agency 
contract, the contract will be declared void. It appears that 
appellants contend that there is in the instant case such a 
lack of mutuality of obligation, and that therefore the agree-
ment is void. It would seem that if appellants were correct, 
they would have an extremely difficult time bringing suit for 
damages for the breach of a void contract. 
Nowhere between the four corners of the subject contract 
does it appear that either party intended the agreement to 
grant an exclusive right to sell. 
This agreement was marked as Exhibit "1" in connection 
with the deposition taken of defendant Dan Stewart (R. 43, 
p. 3) . At line 26, page 4 of this deposition, the question was 
asked: 
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"Q. Let me call your attention to this provision of 
Exhibit c 1' and I am refering to paragraph 3 which 
is captioned CPritnary Sales Territory'-CThe following 
territory is hereby allotted to distributor'-and you 
were the distributor, weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ~As the territory which said distributor is pri-
marily responsible for selling Rock-Ola equipment and 
distributor agrees to use his best efforts diligently to 
promote the sale of and to sell Rock-Ola equipment 
in said territory. Distributor agrees that Rock-Ola shall 
not be obligated or liable to distributor in any manner 
whatsoever for or on account of orders or sales of 
Rock-Ola equipment (including parts and accessories) 
obtained or made by any other distributor or by any 
other person or persons whomsoever in said described 
territory; but Rock-Ola agrees that during the term 
of this agreement, unless sooner terminated as in this 
agreement set forth, and subject to its rights under 
paragraph 6 hereof, Rock-Ola will not sell new Rock-
Ola equipment to any other distributor having an estab-
lished place of business in said described territory.' 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now is that the provision you claim gives you the 
exclusive? 
A. Yes, sir." 
It will be noticed that the caption to the above set forth 
paragraph 4 is in large print, and states ((Primary Sales Terri-
tory." Paragraph 4 sets forth the territory in which the dis-
tributor wil be primarily responsible for selling Rock-Ola 
equipment. The obvious inference here is that the parties 
contemplated other parties selling Rock-Ola equipment in the 
same territory. Indeed, paragraph 4 set forth above spells out 
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unequivocally that the respondent rr shall not be obligated or 
liable to distributor in any manner whatsoever for or on account 
of orders or sales of Rock-Ola equipment obtained or made 
by any other distributor or by any other person or persons 
whonzsoever in said described territory." Thus, not only did 
the parties contemplate the possibility of sales in this territory 
by some other person, but contracted that in such an event, the 
manufacturer [respondent] would not be liable in any manner 
to the dealer [appellants]. 
For the purpose of indicating the intentions of the parties 
in entering into the subject contract, appellants introduced at 
the pre-trial conference (R. 31) certain former agreements 
entered into between appellants and respondent, which agree-
ments were dated January 1, 1954, July 27, 1950, and January 
1, 1955 (Exh. 2). According to appellants, at page 6 of their 
brief: 
''The other agreements for previous years, intro-
duced and received at the pre-trial, used the word 
'exclusive' distributor. The word 'exclusive' was de-
leted from the 1959 contract. However, the 1959 dis-
tributor agreement was and is by its terms an exclusive 
agreement, even though the word 'exclusive' has been 
deleted.'' 
However, a perusal of these prior agreements indicates that 
appellants are not completely accurate. The contract of July 
27, 1950, states in paragraph 1: 
"Rock-Ola hereby grants to distributor and dis-
tributor hereby accepts appointment as a non-exclusit~e 
distributor * * * . '' 
The 1954 and 1955 agreements state, respectively, in 
paragraph 1: 
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"Rock-Ola hereby grants to distributor and dis-
tributor hereby accepts appointment as the exclusive 
distributor * * * . " 
And in paragraph 5: 
nDistributor agrees not to sell Rock-Ola equipment , 
directly or indirectly to any person, firm or corporation 
\vhose place of business is located outside distributor's 
allotted territory.'' 
The governing agreement, that of January 1, 1959 (R. 42, 
Exh. 1), omits any such mention of the words nexclusive 
appointment and states that the territory allotted to the dis-
tributor is the territory in which the distributor is nprimarily 
responsible" for selling Rock-Ola equipment; nor does the 
instant agreement contain any restriction against selling outside 
of the territory. Pages 1 and 2 of the 1955 and 1954 contracts 
have the word nexclusive" printed at the bottom of the first 
page. The 1959 contract does not have the word ((exclusive" 
at the bottom of the first page, nor indeed, does it appear 
anywhere in the contract. Clearly, the parties expressly nego-
tiated the point of exclusiveness at each new contract. Appel-
lants had operated under both exclusive and non-exclusive 
contracts in the past, and knew that each year a new contract 
was negotiated (R. 43, p. 4). 
Contracts of this kind are not pure sales contracts, but 
have some of the characteristics of agency and factorage 
contracts, Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories 
Conzpany, 129 F.2d 177 (8 Cir., 1942). In Indiana Road 
i.\tlachinery Company v. Lebanon Carriage and Emplement 
Company, 25 K.L.R. 1763, (Ky. Court of Appeals) 78 S.W. 
861 ( 1904) , the Court said: 
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(CAn exclusive agency will not be created by impli-
cation where the words of the contract do not naturally 
import this meaning." 
In Dahath Electric Company v. Suburban Electric Develop-
ment Company, 332 Penn. 129, 2 A.2d 765 ( 1938), an action 
was brought by a dealer against the distributor for accounting 
of sales made by another agent appointed for the same territory, 
based upon the theory that the plaintiff had an exclusive agency 
contract with the distributor for the sale of its appliances. 
The Court said that had the parties contemplated an exclusive 
agency contract they would have so provided in the written 
contract. The Court then held that no exclusive agency was 
created by implication from language of provisions in the 
contract referring to ctthe dealer, his territory," and ctthe deal-
er's territory''; or from a reservation of a right in the distributor 
to increase or decrease the agent's territory, or from the require-
ment that the agent send the distibutor copies of its installation 
reports, lists of prospective purchasers, etc., and that the agent 
maintain installation and repair service. 
The cases cited by appellants on pages 3, 4 and 5 of 
appellants' brief are set forth as authority for the interpretation 
of the subject contract. These are cases interpreting contracts 
wherein it is stated that the contracts are to be exclusive, but 
where it is not clear whether the spelled-out exclusiveness 
goes merely to the agency or the right to sell, a distinction 
which is made in 2 Am. Jur., Agency, § 307: 
"Whether or not an agent who is given an exclusive 
agency or right to sell specified property or goods of 
the principal, or is given the exclusive right to sell 
the san1e within the specified territory is entitled to 
10 
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compensation in the event that such property or goods 
are sold, or are sold within the certain territory, by the 
principal or by another agent, depends upon the inter· 
pretation of the contract of employment. According 
to the cases and the American Law Institute Restate-
ment of the La'v of Agency, a contract to give an 
'exclusive agency' to deal with specified property is 
ordinarily interpreted as not precluding competition 
by the principal personally, but only as precluding 
him from appointing another agent to accomplish the 
result. On the other hand, a grant of an 'exclusive 
agency' to sell, i.e., the exclusive right to sell the 
products of a manufacturer or dealer in a specified 
territory, is ordinarily interpreted as precluding com-
petition by the principal in any form within the desig-
nated section. In other words, a distinction has been 
made between an ~exclusive agency' and an exclusive 
right to sell, the principal having a right to sell without 
the payment of compensation to the agent in the former 
case, but not in the latter." 
Appellants do not cite cases going to the issue of whether 
or not the instant agreement gave appellants the exclusive right 
to sell respondent's products in a given territory, but rather 
that the contract itself spelled out exclusiveness, and was 
ambiguous only as to whether the exclusiveness was an exclu-
sive agency or an exclusive right to sell. 
The agreement herein (R. 42, Exh. 1) is an integrated 
contract between the parties, and indeed, appellant Dan 
Stewart does not claim otherwise, page 4, line 6 of his depo-
sition (R. 43) : 
HQ. Is that the agreement on which you rely in this 
proceeding ? 
A. Mainly, yes. 
11 
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Q. Is there any other agreement? 
A. No, that would be the full agreement, as far as 
I know." 
However, appellants contend on page 6 of their brief that 
the subject agreement ((was and is by its terms an exclusive 
agreement even though the word (exclusive' has been deleted." 
Appellants rely for their contention on paragraph 22, which 
states: 
((Distributor shall not sell nor solicit or receive orders 
for any products manufactured by any company other 
than Rock-Ola which competes with Rock-Ola equip-
ment whether current year or prior year equipment. 
This restriction will not apply to the sale of used 
equipment or parts." 
This provision pertains only to appellants in their capacity 
as distributor and has a legitimate business purpose without 
regard to any restrictions on the manufacturer. 
A restriction on the distributor, such as paragraph 22, is 
feasible and usual in business dealings to protect the manufac-
turer who is expending sums on advertising and promotion of 
its wares, which advertising and promotion redounds to the 
benefit of the distributor as well as to that of the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer in effect lends its name and reputation to 
the dealer, allows the dealer to hold himself out as one of 
the manufacturer's dealers and in return requires the dealer 
to bend all his efforts toward promoting only its wares. The 
manufacturer hopes thus to tncrease sales and insure adequate 
customer service. In addition the dealer must carry a full line 
and not merely fast moving items. There is nothing unfair 
about such an arrangement and indeed it is standard procedure 
12 
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in practically every industry between manufacturers and dis-
tributors. Surely the appellants would not have the Court 
believe that parties cannot enter into such a contract. 
As shown above, the agreement did not bestow upon 
appellants the exclusive right to sell respondent's products, 
nor did the parties contemplate such an exclusive agreement. 
Moreover, the respondent could not contract with appellants 
to refuse to sell its merchandise to any other person or dis-
tributor at its factory without being in danger of possible 
violation of statutes prohibiting restraint of trade, such as the 
Sherman Act. 
II. 
EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT HAD GIVEN APPEL-
LANTS SUCH AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT, THERE WAS NO 
BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT BY RESPONDENT. 
Even assuming a straining of the subject agreement so as 
to read into it an exclusiveness which obviously is not present, 
the facts elicited through discovery procedure have demon-
strated that there was no breach of such an agreement. 
Appellants apparently contend that: 
1. Respondent wrongfully cancelled appellants out as a 
dealer of respondent's merchandise; 
2. Respondent sold its products directly to B & G Sales, 
an independent dealer of commercial phonographs; 
3. Respondent conspired with UniCon Distributing Com-
pany of Kansas City, Kansas, one of respondent's dealers, 
to sell respondent's products to B & G Sales indirectly; and 
13 
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4. Respondent financed such sales. 
On page 7 of their brief, appellants state that Mr. Ste\vart 
received a letter on July 7, 1959, sent on July 1, 1959, termi-
nating the dealer agreement between appellants and respondent 
and refer to page 21 of Mr. Stewart's deposition. The testimony 
of Mr. Stewart should be read in full context, beginning at 
page 20, line 14, and continuing through line 20, page 21: 
((A. The answer to that is that we were still planning 
on selling Rock-Ola equipment. Because of not paying 
the $9,000 debt owed, the franchise was cut off and 
given to B & G Sales. Therefore, we have a number of 
parts which is useless to us, and have a number of 
sales which we were unable to fulfill. 
Q. Now, you say that Rock-Ola cancelled your 
agreement. When was that? 
A. To the best of my knowledge four months ago. 
I don't have the exact date. 
Q. That would be around June, July of 1959, is 
that right? 
A. Around July, yes-July 1st. 
Q. And how did they cancel it? 
A. They just started to shipping the B & G Sales 
(sic). 
Q. Did they notify you they were cancelling it? 
A. No, they didn't. 
Q. They did not? 
A. No. 
Q. What you they do other than ship to B & G? 
A. They sent me a registered letter which I didn't 
14 
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get, and also a copy of it was sent to the B & G, which 
I later found out they were the new distributor. 
Q. You say they sent you a registered letter which 
you didn · t get? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You 1nean it wasn't delivered or you refused to 
receive it? 
A. I was out of town at the time and nobody signed 
for it and they sent it back to them. 
D. Do you know what was in that letter? 
A. I heard later that it was-through the B & G 
-I heard later that it was appointing the B & G as 
their new distributor. 
MR. DUNCAN: Will you ask him to fix the date 
of that letter, as near as you can? 
A. That would be around July the 1st. 
Q. Now do you claim that Rock-Ola did not have 
the right to cancel the agreement 
A. No, I don't claim that." 
Appellants state at page 8 of their brief that respondent 
shipped some machines ((directly to Salt Lake City from Rock-
Ola - - Stewart purchased one of these machines and saw 
the label and serial numbers on the other." Appellants refer 
to appellant Dan Stewart's deposition, pages 11 and 12. It 
closer look at the deposition (R. 43) shows otherwise. See page 
11, line 28 and page 12, lines 1 through 19: 
ttQ. Do you know that any of them were shipped 
direct by Rock-Ola to Salt Lake City? 
A. Oh, yes, yes. 
15 
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Q. How do you know that? 
A. I know the one that I bought was shipped direct, 
because I know that one. 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. How do I know? It came in the crate. The crate 
had the labels on it when we picked it up. 
Q. What labels? 
A. The UniCon labels to B & G Sales. 
Q. And how would that show it was shipped from 
Rock-Ola? 
A. It also had Rock-Ola' s labels. 
Q. How did that show it was shipped direct by 
Rock-Ola to Salt Lake City? 
A. How would that? Now actually I donJt claim 
that; I donJt know for sure? 
The positive showing by appellant Dan Stewart that 
there were no shipments made by respondent to B & G Sales 
was amply corroborated by one of the witnesses called by 
appellants, Mr. Melvin C. Gardner [the G of B & G Sales], 
who testified at page 26 of his deposition (R. 44) that he no 
longer was employed by the B & G Sales Company, and on 
page 28 that he no longer owns any stock in said company. 
At page 30, Mr. Gardner testified definitely that he knew 
there was never any merchandise shipped directly from Rock-
Ola Manufacturing Company to B & G Sales Company. At 
page 32 of his deposition, he testified that he received all 
the merchandise that came to B & G Sales and here again 
stated that no merchandise ever came from respondent to 
B & G Sales. 
16 
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Appellants' amended counterclaim (R. 2 5) alleges the 
breach in 1959 of a contract made in January of 1959. How-
ever, on page 7 of their brief, appellants maintain that respond-
ent sold a new current model machine to B & G Sales all 
through 1958. On cross-examination (R. 44, p. 37), Mr. 
Gardner's testimony was as follows: 
ceQ. I believe you testified that you were a mechanic? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you take care of the repatrtng of these 
machines? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where 'Nould you obtain the parts to repatr 
them, the Rock -0 Ia machines ? 
A. From Dan Stewart Company. 
Q. Did you ever obtain any from Rock-Ola? 
A. No, they wouldn't sell them to us. 
Q. Did you ever ask them to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they refused to sell them to you ? 
A. Said we would have to buy them through the 
Dan Stewart Company. 
Q. I believe you mentioned there were some older 
models and then you mentioned some newer models. 
By 'newer', do you mean new? 
A. Well, the policy that UniCon had, they wouldn't 
sell any new. They would sell us floor samples or a 
year old or older. 
Q. Had they been used? 
A. Yes, they had been used." 
17 
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Thus the record shows that the respondent did not sell 
any equipment, new or used, in Utah other than to appellants, 
and further, that B & G Sales Company never received any 
new equipment from UniCon Distributing Company, Inc., 
which company appellants admit (R. 43, p. 14, 1. 7) is merely 
a distributor of Rock-Ola Manufacturing Company and com-
pletely independent of respondent, located, incidentally, in 
Kansas City (R. 43, p. 14, 1. 10) rather than in Wichita, as 
alleged in appellants' amended counterclaim (R. 26). Indeed, 
appellants admit (R. 43, p. 15, 1. 6-8) that respondent could 
do nothing to stop B & G Sales from selling to any one in 
appellants' territory. 
Appellants complain on page 8 of their brief that respond-
ent financed purchases made by B & G Sales from UniCon 
Distributing Company, Inc. The record discloses (R. 42, 
Exh. 2) that four conditional sale agreements for the purchase 
of phonographs were executed by R. ]. Baker and Ellen M. 
Baker, whose addresses appeared on the contract as 140 
South Kansas Street, Wichita, Kansas, in favor of UniCon 
Distributing Company, Inc. One of these four agreements was 
dated January 20, 1958, and stated that the said Bakers would 
pay to the order of UniCon Distributing Company, Inc., the 
sum of $9,788.80 in 24 monthly payments. This paper was 
sold by UniCon Distributing Company, Inc., to respondent and 
the said Baker is still making payments thereon (R. 44, p. 6, 
1. 16-29). The other contracts were discounted to various 
banks (R. 44, p. 6, 1. 4). Appellants apparently would have 
the Court believe that the purchase of a single conditional 
sale contract from a distributor by a manufacturer, \vhen on 
the face of it, the paper shows that the merchandise was 
18 
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destined for an address within that same distributor's territory, 
would amount to wilfull fraud upon another distributor. 
III. 
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
AWARDED. 
The agreement (R. 42, Exh. 1) which is the subject of 
appellants' counterclaim (R. 25), is clear and unequivocal. 
There is no ambiguity to be construed as to whether or not 
this agreement is an agreement for an exclusive franchise to 
sell new machines in the territory set forth. 
However, assuming arguendo that the agreement was 
uexclusive", the record is devoid of any facts showing ( 1) a 
sale of new Rock-Ola equipment in appellants' territory by 
anyone other than appellants, or (2) fraud or ((conniving'' 
of any type on the part of respondent. Appellants have merely 
attempted, by their pleadings and brief, to raise an innuendo 
of fraudulent conduct on the part of the respondent, with no 
facts to support such an innuendo. Indeed, if any such facts 
did exist, it would seem that, at the very least, affirmative 
showing other than mere hints of chicanery would be forth-
coming from Ronald C. Barker, who was the attorney for 
R. J. Baker (R. 44, p. 22, 1. 18-22), and apparently quite close 
to his business (R. 44, p. 15, 1. 29). But the questioning 
of his erstwhile client failed to disclose any actions other than 
those of an independent merchant who bought where he could 
(R. 44, p. 12, 1. 14-30, p. 13, 1. 1-16), sold where he could 
(R. 44, p. 11, 1. 7-21), and didn't mind who knew it (R. 44, 
p. 1 7' 1. 14-18) . 
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In Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Company, 4 Utah 
2d 303, 293 P.2d 700 ( 1956), it was alleged that the defendant, 
through its president, had conspired to defraud plaintiff's 
predecessors in connection with a business transaction. The 
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits 
comprising the record. The Utah Supreme Court said in uphold-
ing the trial court: 
((We do not feel that appellant can be permitted 
to draw favorable inferences from these facts. Infer-
ences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not 
to override it. Inferences are nothing more than the 
probable or natural explanation of facts. Common 
sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should 
not be permitted to be drawn from routine business 
transactions where there are no other circumstances. 
To hold otherwise woudl throw the door open for an 
attack on each and every transaction that one might 
enter into." 
In Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954), 
the Utah Supreme Court said, in affirming the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of defendant: 
((The burden \vas upon the plaintiff * * * ; such a 
finding of fact could not be based on mere speculation 
or conjecture, but only on the preponderance of the 
evidence. This means the greater "reight of the evidence, 
or, as is sometimes stated, such a degree of proof that 
the greater probabtiity of truth lies therein, a choice 
of probabilities does not meet this requirement. _Jt 
creates only a basis for conjecture, upon which a verdiCt 
of the jury cannot stand." 
Apparently, appellants would like the Court to believe 
that in this case there are many facts that don't meet the eye. 
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If such facts do exist, why are they not in the record? In 
1lbdu/kadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d 
53, 318 P.2d 339 ( 1957), the Court said: 
"The first attack plaintiff makes upon the summary 
judgment is that the procedure is to_o hasty. He says 
that if the case had been allowed to come to trial in its 
regular turn on the calendar, he might have been able 
to produce another witness or witnesses. This con-
tention is without merit. The accident happened over 
a year before the motion for summary judgment was 
entered. There was no reasonable assurance that the 
witness referred to, a resident of California, might 
be found within a reasonable time, or at all, nor that 
his testimony would help plaintiff if available. Speak-
ing generally, it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff 
files his action, he has sufficient evidence to demon-
strate a right to recover. All he is entitled to is a 
reasonable opportunity to marshal and present such 
evidence.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants admit that they obtained over $9,000 worth 
of goods from respondent for which they have not paid. Their 
only defense is a naked claim that respondent perpetrated a 
fraud upon appellants and that respondent breached a contract 
which appellants contend is void. The lower court gave more 
than ample opportunity to appellants to come forth with 
some showing of facts sufficient to establish fraud or a breach 
of contract. This appellants could not do and the trial court 
was faced with a record replete with admissions and testimony 
conclusively establishing that: 
1. There was no fraudulent conduct by respondent; 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The subject contract did not establish an exclusive 
agency; and 
3. Even if the contract had been exclusive, there had been 
no breach thereof. 
The trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter W. Billings 
Dudley M. Amoss 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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